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Panr I: Brocn-lpnv
Anthony Mcleod Kennedy (hereinafter "Kennedy") was bom on July 23, 1936 and
raised in Sacramento, Califomia.rHis father, Anthony "Bud" Kennedy ("Bud"), was a
politically connected lawyer and lobbyist in Sacramento, while his mother, Gladys Mcleod
Kennedy, was a schoolteacher and a well-known civic booster amongst the community.2
Kennedy's childhood in Sacramento was "a very reasonable place with reasonable values."3
In the wake of World War II, the seat of California government was a "basically nonpartisan
community" dedicated to "problem solving over finger pointing," and from an early age
Kennedy witnessed a "system that worked" by laking an ad hoc approach to issues which
favored those who could find middle ground.a
When he was ten years old, Kennedy took a year off from school to serve as a page in
the State Senate.5 It was during this apprenticeship that the young Kennedy formed a
friendship with then-govemor 
- 
and future Chief Justice 
- 
Earl Warren.6 Under Warren's
wing, Kennedy leamed intimate details about the legislative and political process, and by the
time Kennedy $aduated high school at the top of his class, his mentor was immortalized as
the author of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education.l
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' Robert Reinhold, Restrained Pragmatist: Anthony M. Kennedy, NEw YoRK TIMES (Nov. 12, 1987),
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Oct. 15,2015).
r Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle,What Will Justice Kennedy Do?,"IIMEMAGAZNE (Jun. 18,
2012), http://search.ebscohost.com.4ogin.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=76502,1O3&site=edslive (last visited
Oct. 15,2015).
5 See Robert Reinhold, supra note 2.
6 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, ^rzpra note 3.
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Kennedy eamed an undergraduate degree from Stanford University in tkee years, and
with the extra year, he went to England and studied at the London School of Economics.8
Kennedy then went to Harvard Law School, where he graduated cum laude in 1961.e After
passing the bar, Kennedy served for one year in the Califomia Army National Guard before
he returned to Sacramento.lo Soon after Kennedy retumed, however, his father died
unexpectedly, and Kemedy took over his father's practice.ll
Kennedy flourished as a lawyer and lobbyist. Working for Capital Records in the
1960's, he drafted an exemption from several sales taxes that the Califomia legislature
approved, saving Capital Records more than $1 million in LP sales.r2 The work experience
and political connections Kennedy gained while working in his father's practice helped to
further his career and his path to thejudicial bench.13 In fact, Justice Kennedy often refers to
his experiences as a working lawyer "in front ofa particularly disagreeable judge or
intractable zoning board" when discussing Supreme Court cases with his law clerks.la
In 1967, Kennedy was recruited to perform miscellaneous legal work for then-
Governor Ronald Reagan.'' Kennedy thrived in this position, and in 1973 he was put in
charge to draft a state constitutional amendment that would cut taxes and spending throughout
California.r6 Although the initiative failed, Governor Reagan was so impressed with Kennedy
that he personally recommended Kennedy for appointment 10 the United States Court of
3 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra note 3.
e See Suppsrlg CouRT BIoGRAPHY, supra note l.
to See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra note 3.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. President Gerald Ford followed the recommendation,lT and at
38 years old, Anthony Kennedy became the youngest federal court ofappealsjudge in United
States history.r8
Kennedy became the head of the Ninth Circuit's conservative minority after the Carter
administration expanded the Ninth Circuit and flooded the federal courts of appeal with
liberal judges.re Though the Ninth Circuit was sharply divided during this period of time,
Kennedy's case-by-case approach and his refusal to adopt broad conclusions and political
rhetoric won him national support among the judiciary, and even Kennedy's opponents
admired his "well-crafted and thoughtful opinions"20
In addition to his work as a lawyer and a circuit judge, Kennedy also taught
Constitutional Law at the Pacific McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento from 1965 until his
appointment to the Supreme Court in 1988.'?r Known to be an enthusiastic teacher, Professor
Kennedy's constitutional law classes were exciting and dramatic. For example, on a lecture on
the Fourth Amendment limits placed on the government's powers of search and seizure,
Professor Kennedy secretly arranged to have the chief of the campus police burst into the
classroom and put him in handcuffs, unbeknownst to his students.22 In honor of the
Constitution's two-hundredth anniversary, Kennedy put on a powdered colonial wig and
taught the day's lectures dressed as James Madison.2s
" 
Id.
r3 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, sapra note 3.
te Anthony M. Kennedy, OYEZ; IIT CHrcAGo KENT CoLLaGE oF LAw, (hereinafter OyEz),
http://www.oyez.org/ justices/anthony_m_kennedy (last visited Oct. l8, 2015).
20 see Supneug CouRT BIoGRApHy,.rrpl4 note l.
'?r PACTFIC MCGEoRGE ScHooL oF LAw, http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Anthony-Kennedy (last visited Oct.
18, 20 r5).
22 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drchle, supra rrote 3.
23 Id.
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Admiring Kennedy's charisma, the law school's dean, Gordon Schaber, asked
Kennedy to help transform Pacific McGeorge Law School into an internationally renowned
institution.'?4 With Kennedy's help, the two accomplished this goal, and during the process the
pair became close friends with a deep intellectual bond lasting well beyond the 23 years
Kennedy taught at Pacific McGeorge Law School up until Schaber's death in 1997.'?5
Significantly 
- 
and without a word spoken between Kennedy and Schaber 
-during the 1970's
Kennedy leamed that Schaber was living the difficult life of a secretly gay man.2u In light of
Kennedy's later decisions in favor of gay rights, a former law clerk to the Justice opined that
Kennedy's long friendship with Schaber "must have had some impact" on him, noting that
Kennedy often tries to reconcile the past with the future.27
When Justice Lewis Powell retired from the Supreme Court in 1987, now-President
Ronald Reagan, who was nearing the end of his second term, nominated Kennedy to fill
Justice Powell's vacancy." However, Kennedy was not Reagan's lrst choice to fill the
vacancy, but his third.2e Reagan's frst nominee, Robert Bork, a staunch conservative with
controversial views on social issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and civil rights, was
blocked by Senate Democrats after 12 days ofpublic hearings.ro Bork's controversial legal
writings 
- 
such as a 1963 magazine article in which he denounced a civil rights bill that would
require businesses to serve blacks and lengthy paper trail ofjudicial opinions in which he
'n Id,
25 Id.
26 Id.
" Id.
28 see Supneue CouRT BIoGRAPHY, Jrpra note 1.
2e See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supr(t note 3.
30 TIME MAGAzTNE, http://content.time.com/time/specials/anicle18953'19-1895421-1895437,00.htm1
(last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
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opposed the Supreme Court on issues such as gender equality, legislative apportionment, and
a 1965 Supreme Court ruling that struck down a state law banning contraceptives for married
couples3r 
- 
led to Bork's defeat by the largest margin in history32 and the origin of a new verb
in the Oxford dictionary.33 Reagan's second nominee, a federal circuit judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia named Douglas Ginsburg,3a was forced
to withdraw his nomination after admitting that he had used marijuana in the 1960's and
1970's while a college student and Harvard Law School professor." Unlike Reagan's last two
choices, Kennedy's nomination encountered little resistance. After the Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings in December 1987, the Senate unanimously confirmed Kennedy's
appointment to the Supreme Court, and Kennedy took his seat as an Associate Justice on
February 18, 1988.36
PaRr II: KnNxpoy's JuruspRuonxrml Prurosopuv: A Moru,l
PrRsprcuvr
According to Justice Kennedy, the greatest tension in interpreting the Constitution lies
between "what the text says and what the dictates of the particular case require from the
3tseeLindaGreenhouse, RobertBork'sTragedy,TusNBwYonrTIurs,(Jan.9,2013),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/robert-borks-tragedy (last visited Nov. 16,2015).
32 The vote was 58 to 42. See id.
33 Indeed, the organized campaign of harsh public outcry and zealous political attack against Robert
Bork's nomination gave rise to the addition of a new dictionary definition: to "bork." See Oxrono DICTIONARY,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/bork (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (defining
the verb borking to mean "obstructing (someone, especially a candidate for public office) through systematic
defamation or vilifi cation").
3a See TluE MecezNg, supra nole 30.
" Id.
36 See SupRelrar Counr Btocnepgv, supra note l.
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standpoint ofjustice and from the standpoint of our constitutional tradition."37 In response to
such duality, Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy embraces a moral reading of the
Constitution, rather than originalism or textualism; two approaches often taken by the Court's
conservative justices in reading the Constitution.38 Kennedy has commented that the proper
method of constitutional interpretation begins with the words of the Constitution, the case
law, and the known understanding of American constitutional tradition; and the question of
where to go from there is governed by overarching and fundamental principles which
Kennedy considers more authoritative than even the Constitution itself.3e
On questions involving liberty and unenumerated rights, Kennedy has stated that
judges must always keep in mind the Framers' central idea regarding American hadition and
the rule of law 
- 
"That there is a zone of libefi, a zone of protection, a line that is drawn
where the individual can tell the Government: Beyond this line you may not go.'{0 Though
this line may be amorphous and wavering, it indeed exists, and it is the function of the
judiciary to define and enforce liberty's breadth and moral content.al
At Kennedy's nomination hearings, when questioned about what factors and
considerations judges should consider when determining where this line must be drawn and
what the Constitution protects under liberty, Kennedy answered:
"A very abbreviated list of the considerations are the essentials of the right to
human dignity, the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the anguish to
the person, the inability of the person to manifest his or her own personality,
37 Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Uniled
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong. 85-86 (1987) (hereinafter Nomination
Hearings) (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
" HELEN J. KNowLEs, Tue Tm Gors ro FRpsoovr: Jusrce ANruoNv M. KsxNsov oN LIsEnrv 6
(2009).
3e Nomination Hearings, supra note 37 , at 86 (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
q Id.
4t Id.
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the inability of a person to obtain his or her own self-fulfillment, the inability
ofa person to reach his or her own potential.'/2
However, Kennedy also cautioned that the above factors must be weighed against "the rights
ofstates which are very strong," and cautioned that in performing this balancing technique,
judges must not forget "the deference that the Court owes to the legislative process...because
[the legislature] knows the values ofthe people.'/3
For Justice Kennedy, the great constitutional question is not spoken in terms of
enumerated and unenumerated rights, but rather a question of "whether or not liberty extends
to situations not previously addressed by the courts, to protections not previously announced
by the courts,'/a and whether such protections can properly be extended while still respecting
the constitutional boundaries and deference the Court owes to the legislative p.o"ess.ot
Likewise, the nomination hearings proved to be the first venue that captures the soon-
to-be-justice articulating his strong adherence to a moral approach in reading the Constitution,
where he is candidly speaking ofan overarching and guiding moral principle that exists in and
ofitself, which is neither defined by nor owes its existence to the Constitution, and is greater
than even the Constitution itself. As Kennedy put it, "I am searching, as I think manyjudges
are, for the correct balance in constitutional interpretation,'{6 and described the effort to
understand and implement hanscendent moral principles found outside the Constitution as an
"exploration."aT
12 Id. at 180.
ot ld.
4Id.at87.
a5 Nomination Hearings, supra Dote 37 , at 88 (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
4 \d. at 154.
o' !d.
,l
During those hearings, Kennedy was pressed to discuss the ways in which society's
values have changed over time and the effect that any change has had on the nation's laws.as
Kennedy retorted that although society may initially accept certain inequities that it later
shuns, the transformation in the nation's thinking does not mean that society's values have
changed over a period of time.ae Explaining that "a Constitution that simply enacted the status
quo"50 would serve no purpose, Kennedy believes that "what the framers had in mind was to
rise above their own injustices,"sl and shares the framers' understanding that "sometimes it
takes humans generations to become aware of the moral consequences, or the immoral
consequences, of their own conduct. That does not mean that moral principles have not
remained the same."52
These moral principles are the bedrock to Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential
philosophy 
- 
that enduring, overarching values ring true regardless of the meaning attached to
the Constitution at any given time, and that these principles and values are implicit to the
Constitution. While the moral content of the Constitution may be clarified by traditional
sources such as history, American tradition, original intent, and precedent, the full and
necessary meaning of liberty may extend to non-traditional sources as well.53 Accordingly,
Kennedy's opinions have cited to social science research, the direction of political and
o' Id. at 152-53.
o'Id.
50 Nomination Hearings,supranote3T,atl52 (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
t' Id.
52 Id. at 153.
s3 FneNr J. Colucct, Jusncg KrNNgov's JuntspnunENcE: THE Ful-l nNo NECESSARy MEANING oF
LTBERTY 75 (2009).
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national consensus, and international law to provide objective secondary sources for the moral
content of liberty in the Constitution.sa
Plnr III: Casr Axuysrs
A: Rplrcrous FRproorvrs
Kennedy's position on religious freedoms and the Establishment Clause draws a
distinction between governmental action that establishes religion versus governmental
policies of "accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion," which Kennedy
considers to be an acceptable part of American political and cultural heritage.55 As discussed
more fully below, governmental action may accommodate religion by passively recognizing
the central role religion plays in society, while governmental action that compels an
individual to support or participate in religious practice violates Kennedy's "coercion
principle." Absent coercion, religious accommodation never violates the Establishment
Clause unless it provides "substantial and direct benefits" to religion.56
C o u nty of All e g h e ny v. A C L U (concwring opinion w ith partiil dissent #l)
ln County of Allegheny v. ACLU, a case involving the public display of a menorah and
a nativity scene inside a county courthouse, the Court voted to allow the menorah to be
displayed inside the courthouse but not the nativity scene. The majority held that the display
of the nativity scene was unconstitutional because the display had the impermissible effect of
indicating government endorsement of religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause.57
The majority concluded that the menorah, which was displayed next to a Christmas tree in the
to Id.
5t Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pinsburgh Chapter,492 U.S. 573,657
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
tu Id.at662-663.
s1 Id.at603.
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courthouse halls, simply recognized that two secular holidays both occurred during the winter
season, while the nativity scene, which was separately placed on a staircase and contained
distinct Christian text, unconstitutionally endorsed a patently Christian message.58 In making
the determination that the nativity display unconstitutionally established govemmental
endorsement ofreligion, the majority indicated that the primary question is that of"what
viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose ofthe display."se
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion with a partial dissent in which he noted
that the Constitution 'permits government some latitude in recogtrizing and accommodating
the central role religion plays in our society."60 To hold otherwise would require a "relentless
extirpation ofall contact between government and religion," where the government would be
"preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe."6r
Criticizing the majority's approach as "unjustified hostility towards religion,'62
Kennedy advocated for the "accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion" by
arguing that "any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border on latent hostility
toward religion, as it would require govemment... to acknowledge only the secular, to the
exclusion and to the detriment of the religious."63
Kennedy carefully distinguishes governmental action that "accommodates" religion
versus action that "establishes" religion by applying two principles: hrst, the "government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise," and second,
sr Id-
se Id- at 595.
@ Alle gheny, 492 tJ .S . at 65'1 .
6tId. at 658.
62 Id-at 655.
63 Id. at 65'7 .
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that govemment "may not give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."e
Kennedy disagreed with the majority who voted to allow the menorah to be displayed
inside the courthouse but not the nativity scene. Joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and
Scalia, Kennedy argued that both the menorah and the nativity scene were "within the realm
offlexible accommodation" because both were purely passive symbols and posed no realistic
danger as a form of coercion on individuals inside the courthouse.65
Zee v. Teisrzaz: The Protection of Personal Liberty Trumps All (majority opinion #l)
Following his dissefi in Allegheny, where he voted to uphold the public display of two
religious symbols on govemment property, Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee v. lleisman
came as a surprise to those expecting him to follow similar reasonng.ln Allegheny, Kennedy
argued that the symbols were noncoercive because they served as passive reminders of the
faiths represented in the community, and that their presence inside the courthouse did not
force anyone to participate in any religious activity.66
The issue ir Lee y. Ileisman involved clergy led prayer at a public middle school
graduation and arose when a student's father challenged the prayer as a form ofgovernment
sponsorship ofreligion in violation ofthe Establishment Clause.67 The school had a policy
allowing clergy members to deliver invocations and benedictions during school graduation
ceremonies.68 The issue seemed identical lo Allegheny because the students at the graduation
ceremony were not being forced to actively participate in the prayer and could ignore it ifthey
@ Id. at 659.
65 td. at 577 .
66 td. at 663.
6? Lee v. Weisman,505 U.S. 577 (1992).
63 See id,
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wished, and as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, prayer at public school gmduations is a
"longstanding American tradition"6e that has as little ofan effect on nonparticipating students
as the menorah and nativity scene displays did on individuals inside Allegheny' s courthouse.
Initially voting to uphold the school prayer, Kennedy reversed after realizing that
"[his] draft looked quite wrong" Kennedy instead focuses on personal liberty and began his
opinion by stating that "divisiveness over the choice of a particular member ofthe clergy to
conduct the ceremony" is highly apparent.To Utilizing the coercion principle, Kennedy found
that the pressures brought against students in formal school ceremonies such as a gaduation
coupled with no reasonable altemative other than nonattendance, could act as a form of
coercion.Tl
Differentiating the factors from Allegheny, Kennedy noted that while attendance at the
ceremony was not technically mandatory in order to graduate, "[e]veryone knows that in our
society high school graduation is one of life's most significant occasions. . .and to say a
teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic to the
extreme."72 Calling the school's level of involvement in the graduation ceremony, including
the choice ofprayer, "pervasive to the point ofcreating a state-sponsored and state-directed
religious exercise,"?3 Kennedy was concemed that in the school setting this "may end in a
policy to indoctrinate and coerce"?4 
- 
a concept that is antithetical to personal liberty.
6e Id. 
^t 
632.
10 Id . at 58'7 .
1t Id. at 593.
12 weisma4,505 lJ 
-S . 
^t 
595 .
11 td . at 58'l .
1a Id-at 592.
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Kennedy concluded by declaring "[i]t is a tenet ofthe First Amendment that the State
cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights as the price ofresisting
conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.T5 Accordingly, despite the possibility that a
majority of the students might not have objected to the prayer or been supportive ofit, these
factors were outweighed by the demand to guarantee that all persons are able to fully exercise
their personal liberty and be free fiom any form of coercion.T6
B: Hulrax Drcxrrv axo Prnsoxa.l Lrnnnrv
Without question, the foundation ofJustice Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy lies
in the values of human dignity and personal liberty. As discussed more fully below, in the
event that Kennedy has taken an unexpected or surprise position on a controversial issue, it is
safe to say that the reason is due to Kennedy's fear that any other conclusion would infringe
upon the values ofhuman dignity and personal liberty in violation ofthe United States
Constitution.
I: AnonuoN
The Road to Case.y
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,l1 the landmark case that established
the right to choose to have an abortion as a constitutionally protected liberty interest under lhe
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.T8 However, the majority qualified its
15 Id-at596.
16 Id.at595-96.
" 4lo u.s. I l3 (1973).
13 See id. at 170 ("Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct in holding that the right asserted by Jane
Roe is embraced within the personal libefty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment") (Stewart, P., concurring).
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ruling by stating that abortion is not an absolute right and states may enact regulations to limit
the abortion decision by demonstrating a compelling state interest.Te That monumental
holding caused a sharp division among the nation, and a meager sixteen years later the Court
was faced with its first legitimate opporhmity to reverse is decision. In the 1989 case of
Webster v. Reproductive Hea h Semices,so the State of Missouri and the United States
expressly asked the Supreme Court to rcverse Roe v. Wade.sl
ln llebsler v. Reproductive Health Services,the Court was presented with a
constitutional challenge ofa Missouri statute regulating the performance ofabortions.82 The
statute's preamble specified that "[t]he life ofeach human being begins at conception," and the
statute codified the following restrictions on abortion: physicians were required to perform
viability tests upon women beginning in their twentieth week of pregrancy; public employees
and public facilities could not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to
save the mother's life; and "encouragement and counseling" to have abortions was
prohibited.83
ln a fractured 5-4 decision, a majority ofthe Court declined to explicitly ovemrle Roe,
although it upheld all ofthe statute's challenged provisions. Justice Rehnquist, who authored
the majority opinion, asserted that "[t]his case ... affords us no occasion to revisit the holding
of Roe ... and we leave it undisturbed."8a
1e Id. at 154.
30 492 u.s. 49o, 496, ( 1989).
3r Indeed, the United States argued for Roe's reversal alongside the State of Missouri as amicus curiae,
see id. at 496.When the Couft accepted rev\ew of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,the United States again
participated as amicus curiae and argued for Roe's reversal, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 ,842 (1992).
3x See id-
31 
webster , 492 lJ .S . at 4q .
84 td. at 521 .
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The majority found that the statute's conclusion that life begins at conception does not
contradict Roe because the conclusion is encompassed in the statute's preamble and thus
imposes no substantive restrictions on access to abortion." The majority also held that
prohibiting the use of government workers and facilities to perform abortions is
constitutionally permissible because the constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right
to abortion established by Roe does not include the right to government assistance in
obtaining one, and Missouri's ban on the use of its facilities and employees for abortion
purposes "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate
her pregnancy."tu Lastly, the majority ruled that the requirement of viability testing at 20
weeks is constitutional, stating that "we do not see why the State's interest in protecting
potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there
should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it
before viability."87
Although the Roe decision narrowly survived lY'ebster,the Webster holding revealed a
new conservative majority on the Supreme Court with a greater willingness to uphold
governmental restrictions placed on abortions. In fact, Justice Rehnquist concludes the
opinion with a dire warning regarding the constitutional protection of abortion as a liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment by stating: "To the extent indicated in our opinion,
we would modiff and narrow Roe andsucceeding cases."8E
Planned Parenthood v. CasE (mtjority opinion#2\
" Id. at 506 ("Roe v. Wade implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion. The preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value judgment").
86 Id.at509.
87 td.at5l9.
88 webster,492 U.S. at 521 .
l5
ln light of Webster, a mere three years later Justice Kennedy took an unexpected
positio;r_in disrqgard to conventional conservative politics and ideology in the seminal
abortion case P/anned Parenthood v. Casey, where Justice Kennedy joined Justices O'Connor
and Souter to issue ajoint opinion upholding as constitutional a woman's right to have an
abortion.8e In its analysis, the joint opinion reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
fiom govemmental interference more liberty interests than the provisions of the first eight
amendments enumerate or that have been declared byjudicial decision.eo According to the
plurality, "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time ofthe
adoption ofthe Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits ofthe substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects."er For example, even though the
Constitution does not expressly enumerate a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a
married couple's choice to use contraceptives, the Fourteenth Amendment indeed protects
such a liberty interest.e2
Thejoint opinion noted that the test for whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
liberty interest is not whether that interest is expressly included in the Constitution's text, but
rather, "[t]he inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call
upon the Court in interpreting thc Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment."es To this extent, the plurality
3e Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
s 1d. at 847 ("It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that
liberty encompasses no more than thosc rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference
by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. But of course this Court has never
accepted that view").
'q' Id. ar 848.
",1d. at 849 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
e3 td. at 849 .
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argued that reasoned judgment should be the test used to determine whether a constitutionally
protected libefi interest exists.
Applying the reasoned judgment test, the joint opinion stated that "[t]he controlling
word in the cases before us is "liberty,"ea and in what is now famously known as the "mystery
passage," Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy (who, it later turned out, authored the
passage)e5 declare that:
"Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart ofliberty is the right to define one's own concept ofexistence, of
meaning, ofthe universe, and of the mystery ofhuman life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes ofpersonhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State."e6
According to thejoint opinion, the liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects extends to
matters such as marriage, procreation, contracqrtion, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. The crucial characteristic that these matters share is that they all concern "the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy." Recognizing that "in some critical respects the abortion decision is of
the same character"eT as the matters listed therein, the Justices believe that this shared
e4 Id. at 846.
e5 See, e.g., Stuart Taylor lr., Exclusive Interyiew: Justice Anthony Kennedy on the Cotrr, NEwSwEEK
(Jul. 15, 2007) (last visited Nov. 26, 2015) http 1/w\'e'^,,newsweek.comlexclusive-justice-anthony-kennedy-court-
104067', and lames F. Simon, THE CENTER HoLDs: THE PowER STRUGGLE INstDE THE REHNeursr CouRT 163-
65 (1995) (detailing how authonhip ofthe section ofCasey containing the mystery passage has been credibly
attributed to Justice Kennedy). Indeed, prior to the 2007 Newsweek interview that revealed Kennedy as the
author ofthe mystery passage, Kennedy quoted the same passage in his 20O3 majority opinion striking down a
Texas statute that criminalized homosexual sodomy. See Lawrence v. Texas,539 U.S. 558 (2003).
e6 Casey,505 U.S. at 851.
e1 ld. at852.
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characteristic tips the reasoned judgment test in favor ofrecognizing a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in the right to terminate a pregnancy.'*
In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Justices for employing the reasoned
judgment test, arguing that it does not yield an intelligible rule. Noting that the Court cannot
look to history to consistently interpret which liberty interests are contained in the
Constitution because some forns ofconduct to which the mystery passage applies have long
been criminalized in American society,ee Justice Scalia concluded, "[i]t is not reasoned
judgment that supports the Court's decision; only personal predilection."l00 According to
Scalia, if the Court does not find the scope of constitutionally protected liberty interests
strictly fiom the text ofthe Constitution itself, only personal preferences, not reasoned
judgment, can shape the scope.
Despite Justice Scalia's concems, the plurality confines the legal analysis to the single
issue ofwhether a constitutionally protected liberty interest extends to the right to terminate a
pregnancy, and if so, what limits the government may impose on it. Moreover, in the
paragraph immediately following the mystery passage, the Justices distinguish the choice to
terminate a pregnancy from those decisions traditionally recognized as liberty interests
carrying Fourteenth Amendment protections, such as marriage, procreation, contraception,
e3Id. at 849 ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon
the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition couns always have
exercised: reasoned judgment").
ee See id. at983-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in pan and dissenting in part) ("But it is
obyious to anyone applying "reasoned judgment" that the same adjectives can be applied to many forms of
conduct that this Coun has held are not entitled to constitutional protection 
- 
because, Iike abortion, they are
forms of conduct that have long been criminalized in American society. Those adectives might be applied, for
example, to homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally "intimate" and
"deepuyl personal" decisions involving "personal autonomy and bodily integrity," and all of which can
constitutionally be proscribed because it is our unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proscribable.
It is not reasoned judgment that supports the Court's decision; only personal predilection.")
tN Id- at984.
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family relationships, child rearing and education. Finally, the Justices distinguish the right to
choose abortion from all other choices, stating, "[a]bortion is a unique act."rol
Reminding the reader that not all liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are
expressly enumerated in the Constitution, the plurality recognized that prior case law
documented "the right of the individual. . .to be free from unwarranted govemmental
intrusion."r02 Moreover, "[t]he full scope ofthe liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms olthe specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution" and Kennedy points to precedent in which the Court extended
constitutional protection to other unmentioned liberty interests relating to m.uriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.r03
Given the personal and intimate suffering a woman experiences in choosing whether
or not to terminate a pregnancy and the anguish she endures in living with the implications ol
that decision, traditional beliefs and the dominant cultural vision ofmotherhood and fetal life
"cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice."roa Staying true to his
jurisprudential philosophy, Kennedy boldly asserts, "[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code."lO5
Though he found a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to have an
abortion, Kennedy qualified this right by stating that this liberty is not unlimited, and States
may permissibly create measures designed to persuade mothers to choose childbirth over
'ot Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
Io'? See id. (emphasis in original).
'0r Id. lciting Carey v. Population Services htemarional, 431 U.S., at 6g5).
tM Id. at 852.
'05 Id. ar 850-
t9
/abortion provided they are reasonably related to that goal and do not unduly burden the
woman in exercising her right to choose abortion.l06
StezDerg v, Carrrar, (dissentine opinion #1)
Justice Kennedy wrote a vehement dissent in ,ienDerg v. Carhart,in which the
majority struck down Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortion.r0' The law at issue banned two
partial birth abortion procedures, the D & E and the D & X.r08 Kennedy described the former
as a procedure "forcing the fetus into the vagina, the pulling of extremities off the body in the
process of extracting the body parts from the uterus...kills the fetus," and the latter as "the
fetus is partially delivered into the vagina before a separate procedure, the so-called reduction
procedure, is performed in order to kill the fetus."roe The majority held the law
unconstitutional for two reasons- First, the law was unconstitutional because ir did not include
an exception to protect the health or life of the mother. Second, the law was unconstitutionally
vague in that "even if the statute's basic aim is to ban D & X, its language makes clear that it
also covers a much broader category of procedures," r'o thereby by placing an undue burden on
the abilitv for women to obtain anabortion.
,uJY
Although he wrot)(e Casey opinion, Kennedy felt Nebraska's law did not place an
undue burden on the right to choose an abortion and was therefore constitutional. Kennedy
believed that the majority was extending abortion righls far beyond the holding of Casey, and
that the majority further disregarded Casey's assertion that states have a substantial interest in
protecting unborn life.
rG Casey,5O5 U.S. at 877-78.
r07 Stenberg v. Carhan, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
toB See id . at g7 5-'1 6 .
t@ ld.
tto Id. at 939 -
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Agreeing with the majority that the procedures were indeed "clinically cold and
callous," Kennedy noted the medical terminology the majority used when speaking about
them, including "transcervical procedures," and "instrumental disarticulation" and further
accused the majority of "view[ing] the procedures from the perspective of the abortionist
rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when confronted with a new method of
ending human life."rrt
According to Kennedy ,"Casey is premised on the States having an important
constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate,"rr2 and under that
framework are allowed to enact laws to "promote the life of the unborn and to ensure respect
for all human life and its potential."rr3Additionally, in the need to protect the "dignity and
value of human life,"lla states may take measures to ensure "the medical profession and its
members are viewed as healers,"r'5 including the enactment of a ban "forbidding medical
procedures which might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to become
insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in the human fetus."r16
II: Gay aNn Lrsnr.lx Rtcnrs
Prior to Romer v. Evans, none of Kennedy's decisions have ever sided in favor of a
gay or lesbian petitioner.rrT While on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Kennedy ruled five
ttt Id. at957 .
"' Stenberg,s3O U.S. at961.
tt3 Id. at957.
tta Id. at96l-62.
,t5 Id.
,tu ld.
t'7 See loyce Murdoch & Deb Price, CouRTING Jusrrcg: Gey MnN AND LESBIANS v. THE Supnsrlg
Counr (2001).
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times in cases dealing with homosexuals, each time ruling against them.ll8 Moreover, due to
Kennedy's voting record on this issue, his 1987 nomination was opposed by gay
organizations.r re Despite this, Kennedy has indeed expressed an openness to provide gays and
lesbians some form of constitutional protection. For example, in a 1980 decision upholding
the Naly's discharge ofa gay sailor, Kennedy opined that had the case involved the same
intimate activity in a private setting, as opposed to being in the military context, the case may
very well "face substantial constitutional challenge."120
Moreover, at his nomination hearings, when questioned directly about which private
consensual activities are constitutionally protected, Kennedy was steadfast in his beliefthat
the Constitution must be interpreted beyond its text to include privacy rights not expressly
enumerated.r2lAs discussed eartier, it is indeed in response to the constitutional protection
specifically of "private consensual activities" where Kennedy provides his list of'liberty
interest considerations' 
- 
human dignity; the injury, harm, and anguish to the person; the
inability to manifest his or her own personality; and the inability to obtain his or her own self-
fu lfi llment and potential. r22
lla t)
\e ld,
re Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. l98O) ("The reasons which have led the cou( to
protect some priyate decisions intimately linked with one's personality. . . and family living arrangements beyond
the corc nuclear family suggest that some kinds of govemment regulation of private consensual homosexual
behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge").
t2t See Nomination Hearings, supra note 37, at 180 (question by Sen. Cordon J. Humphrey: "What
standards are there available to ajudge, a Justice in this case, to determine which private consensual activities
are protected by the Constitution and which are not").
,r, Id.
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In light ofthis, it becomes clear that Justice Kennedy has in fact foreshadowed his
future gay rights decisions by articulating his beliefthat there is some kind of constitutionally
protected liberty interest the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.i23
ftonrer v. Eyarrs:'A state cannot deem a class of citizens a stranqer to its law" (majoritv
opinion # 3)
Writing for the majoity in Romer v. Evazs, Justice Kennedy concluded that
Colorado's 'Amendment 2' violated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.l2a Approved
by voters living in Colorado, Amendment 2 sought to overturn the state's existing
antidiscrimination protections provided to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals living in Colorador25
and to further prohibit the state from enacting any future protections.126
Kennedy began the opinion by quoting Justice Harlan's 1896 dissenting opinion in
Plessy v. Ferguson, in which Justice Harlan stated that the Constitution "neither knows nor
tolerates classes among ci tizens,"tz1 and analogized it to the understanding of the Court's
commitment to the "law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake."r28 By
referencing one of the most criticized cases upholding institutionalized discrimination in U.S.
history, Justice Kennedy has framed the struggle for gays and lesbians as an issue of human
dignity and pursuing the moral content ofliberty. Kennedy called Amendment 2
r23 See CoLUCCI, sapra note 53, at l3 (noting that Justice Kennedy looks to "moral concepts embodied
by the text of the Constitution ... [to] provide the basis for determining the extent of the personal liberty that
couns have a duty to enforce").
r2a Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
t2s See id - at 623-24 (including bans on "housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and
health and welfare sewices"). see a/so BoULDER REV.coDE g l2-l-1 (defining "sexual orientation" as ,.the
choice of sexual partners, i.e., bisexual, homosexual or heterosexual"); DENVER REv. MUNICIPAL coDE, ART.
IV, $ 28-92 (defining "sexual orientation" as "[t]he status of an individual as to his or her heterosexuality,
homosexuality or bisexuality").
t26 Romer - 5l'7 lJ .S . at 624 .
"? 163 u.s. 537,557 (1896).
t23 Romer.5l7 lJ .5. at 623 ,
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"unprecedented in our jurisprudence" and "not within our constitutional tradition" to enact
such a law because it singles out a specific class of persons based on a single trait and denies
them "the right to seek specific protection from the law."r2e
Rejecting the argument that Amendment 2 merely removes the "special rights"
conferred only to gays and lesbians, Kennedy is empathetic and humanizes gays and lesbians
by explaining that the protections the law withholds "are protections taken for granted by
most people because they already have them or do not need them"r3o and to uphold the law
would be to deny homosexuals "the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without
constraint."r3rReiterating the importance of human dignity, Justice Kennedy concludes the
opinion by stating that Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
because the law makes "[homosexuals] unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.l
State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its lows."t3z
Zarprence v. Iexas: The protection of private activity through the full meaning of liberty
(majori(v opinion #4)
ln Lawrence v. Texas, Kennedy held that a Texas sodomy law criminalizing
homosexuals, but not heterosexuals, from engaging in certain private, consensual, intimate
activity unconstitutionally violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute
"imping[ed] on the[] exercise of liberty a interest protected by the Due Process Clause."l33
Boldly ovemrling the court's prior decisi on in Bowers v. Hardwict, Kennedy once again
'2e Id.l"Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once too narrow and too
broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting
disqualification ofa class ofpersons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in
our jurisprudence.").
t3o Id.at63l.
t3t Id.
t32 Id.at635.
'3'Lawrence v. Texas,539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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humanized the gay and lesbian community and the importance of their human dignity in
stating: 'Bowers was not corect when it was decided, and it is not correct today"l3a and that
"[i]ts continuance as precedent demeans the lives ofhomosexual persons."ll5
Framing the issue as "whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the
private conduct in the exercise oftheir liberty under the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment,"r36 Kennedy uses Zaw rence as an opportunity to expand on his comments
during his nomination hearings regarding the importance of some form of constitutional
protection for private, consensual, intimate activity; and begins the opinion in full:
"Liberty protects the person from unwarranted govemment intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in
the home. And there are other spheres ofour lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of selfthat includes
freedom ofthought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The
instant case involves.liberty 
rof 
the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensrons.
Noting that the constitutional liberty interest extends beyond mere spatial bounds to embrace
"an autonomy ofselfthat includes freedom of&ought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct," Kennedy concludes that it is a simple task to find that private, consensual, intimate
activity fatls within the confines ofa constitutionally protected liberty interest.138
t31 Id . at 578 .
t15 td. at 57 5.
t16 Id. at 5&-
t31 lnwre nce , 539 lJ .S . at 562.
'33 See id. at 578 ("The present case does not inyolve mino6. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It docs not involve whether the govemment must giye formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual pmctices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention ofthe govemment").
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The scope ofthe liberty interesl Kennedy articulaled, in Lawrerce, even by its own
terms, reaches beyond private, consensual, intimate activity. Citing his majority opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice Kennedy stated that homosexuals are entitled to the
same level of constitutional protection as heterosexuals when it comes to "choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy"r3e and, just as heterosexuals, homosexuals also have the right
"to define one's own concept ofexistence, of meaning, ofthe universe, and ofthe mystery of
human life."rao
As in Romer y. Evans,Kennedy provides little discussion on the state's asserted basis
for the sodomy law. Texas claimed that it had an interest in "the preservation of marriage,
families and the procreation ofchildren" that was independent fiom a moral disapproval of
gay people.la'
Kennedy rejected Texas's assertions for the basis for the criminalization of same-sex
sodomy, and stated that the only believable basis for the criminal statute was majoritarian and
moral disapproval, which was not a valid justification for the law. For this point, Kennedy
cited to Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick "[T]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffrcient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."ra2
ODergEl?// y. Iladges: Same Sex Marriage As a Constitutional Libertv Risht (majority
opinion #5)
t3e Id. at 574.
'4 Id.
Iar see DALE Ce.rpsNTER, FLAGRANT CoNDUCT: THE SToRy oF LAVRENCE v. TEx AS (2012) 
^r 
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(quoting Charles Rosenthal, the lawyer for Texas, at oral argument for Lawrence).
ta2 See Lawrence,539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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In the landmark decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that there was a
fundamental constitutional right for same sex couples to marry under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.ra3
In the opinion, Kennedy wrote that the Constitution guarantees fundamental liberty to
all individuals, and in addition to the liberty rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
these liberties extend to "certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs."'oo Libert), has been
extended to include "the right to marry," which the court had reiterated in previous decisions
to be "fundamental under the Due Process Clause."las Deeming marriage "essential to our
most profound hopes and aspirations," the right to marry is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest because marriage promises "nobility and dignity to all persons," and is tethered to the
"centrality... of the human condition."la6
Kennedy identified four principles and traditions that prove the right to marry was a
fundamental liberty interest under the Constitution and equally applicable to same sex
couples. First, "the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy."laT Second, "the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals."l4s Third,
marriage "safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
ra3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (ZOl5).
144 Id.
'05 Id. at 2598 (citing M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102 (1996);Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur,414 U.S.632,639-&0 (1974); Griswold, supra, at 486,85 S.Ct. 1678; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
146 Id. at2594.
ta1 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at2599.
148 Id. at2599.
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childrearing, procreation, and education."lae Fourth and finally, the Court's prior cases and the
nation's traditions make clear that "marriage is a keystone ofour social order."lsO
Addressing the first principle, Kennedy wrote that the enduring connection between
marriage and liberty is the reason why in 1967 the Loving Court invalidated intenacial
marriage bans under the due Process Clause.lst Decisions conceming marriage are among the
most intimate that an individual can make, and for the Court to have found protectable liberty
interests in choices conceming "contraception, family relationships, procreation, and
childbearing" 
- 
but not the right to marry 
- 
would be, in the court's own words,
"contradictory with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in our society."l52 Kennedy wrote that the nature of marriage is that through an
enduring bond, two people can find other freedoms and build a singular life together 
- 
and
"this is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.""t "Ther" is dignity in the bond
between two men or two women who seek to marry and in tleir autonomy to make such
profound choices."r5a
In his second principle, Kennedy wrote that the Court's jurisprudence shows a
vehement protection of the importance of marriage and the intimate association between
partners marriage supports, and thereby regarding marriage fundamental. Kennedy noted that
the intimate association protected by this right was c enlral in Griswold v. Connecticut, which
held the Constitution protecls the right of married couples to use contraception. Suggesting
tle Id. at2(f,0.
te td. at2@1.
'5r See Loving v. Virginia,388 U.S. I (1967).
ts2 Obergeletl,l35 S. Cr. at 2599 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail,434 U.S. 374,384 (1978).
'53 Id . at 2599 .
28
that marriage is a rig}t "older than the Bill of Rights," in which two people "come[] together
for better or worse," the Griswold Court described marriage aspran association "that promotes
a way of life. . . a harmony in living, bilateral loyalty. .. for as noble a purpose as any involved
in our prior decisions." Kennedy wro1e, "the right to marry thus dignifies couples who wish to
define themselves by their commitment to each other," and same-sex couples have the same
right as heterosexual couples to enjoy intimate association. Noting that Iawrence mercly
confirmed a liberty interest in freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a criminal
offense, Kennedy was clear in that "it does not follow that freedom stops there," and the right
for same sex couples to enjoy intimate association extends beyond Lawrence because that
case "does not achieve the fufl promise ofliberty."ls5
Addressing the third principle, Kennedy wrote that the Court has indeed recognized
that the right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children is a "central part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause."r56 Kennedy argued that the marriage laws at issue
harmed and humiliated the children ofsame-sex couples because "without the recognition,
stability, and predictability"r5T marriage offers, children being raised by unmarried parents
would suffer stigma by feeling that their families are somehow lesser. Noting that there are
"hundreds ofthousands ofchildren are presently being raised by Isame-sex] couples,"r58
Kennedy looked to social science research to show that a majority ofstates currently allow
gays and lesbians to adopt to confirm that even the govemment itselfbelieves that gays and
lesbians "can create loving, supportive families."r5e Kennedy also stated that the right to
tss ld . at 2599-oO .
t56 Id . at 2600 .
ts1 Ober|efetl,l35 S. Cr. at 2600-0 l.
153 Id.
,5" ld.
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marry could not be held less meaningful for those who cannot have children and the states
may not condition the right to marry on the capacity to procreate because "constitutional
marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one."ro
Finally, Kennedy argued that States have contributed to the fundamental character of
marriage by placing it at the center ofmany facets ofthe legal and social order, and there is
no difference between same-sex and heterosexual couples with regard to this final principle.
Because same-sex couples are denied the right to marry, they are also denied the benefits that
have been attached to marriage, which Kennedy believed to have "the effect ofteaching that
gays and lesbians are unequal," and same-sex couples have been "consigned an instability
many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives."
In light ofthese four principles and traditions regarding the fundamental right to marry
as a constitutionally protected liberty interest, Kennedy wrote "[i]t demeans gays and lesbians
for the State to lock them out ofa central institution ofthe Nation's society. Same-sex
couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its
highest meaning."l6l
Kemedy concluded the landmark decision not with traditional constitutional legalese
often employed by the judiciary, but with a poetic passage about the morals of love, marriage,
and human dignity 
- 
a message that surely resonates throughout the country:
"No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals
of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union,
two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the
petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may
endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say
they disrespecl the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it,
'@ Id.
t6t Id - at 2602 .
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respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their
hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of
civilization's oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the
law. The Constitution grants them that right.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered."162
C: FnBn Sprncn
In the near three decades that Kennedy has served on the Supreme Court, he has
gained a reputation as being "the foremost defender of free speech principles on the modern
Court."r63 Kennedy has stated that the First Amendment is vital because it "ensures the
dialogue that is necessary for the continuance of the democratic process" and that it protects
individuals "to all ways in which we express ourselves as persons.'s
Teras v.,Ioftzson: "It is fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in
contemp!" (concurring opinion #2)
For Justice Kennedy, free speech must be protected regardless of the form that a
person's expression may take, including expressive conduct.165 InTexas v. Johnson,the Court
was asked to decide whether the First Amendment protects a person's actions when he
violates a state statute that prohibits him from burning the American flag.166 The Court held
that the respondent's act of burning an American flag during a political protest held outside
162 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
163 Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Comment,./z stice Kennedy's Free Speech Jurisprudence: A
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis,44 McGeoncr L. Rsv. 167 - lg9 (20 I 3).
tu See Nomination Hearings, supra note 37, at I I I (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
'65 See Texas v. Johnson,491 U.S. 3g7,420 (19g9).
t66 Id. at 370.
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the Republican National Convention in Dallas constituted expressive conduct that was
protected under the First Amendment.r6T
The Court held that based on the context of Johnson burning the American flag as part
of a political demonstration taking place outside the Republican as the GOP was officially re-
nominating Ronald Reagan as presidential candidate, the overt political nature ofJohnson's
act was "overwhelmingly apparent" and therefore the flag buming constituted expressive
conduct protectable by the First Amendment.r66 The majority concluded that "[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.r6e
Kennedy filed a separate concurrence that sheds light on the moral interpretation he
uses to read the Constitution and the values he interjects into the Constitution's text. Making
it perfectly clear that he did not condone Johnson's actions, Kennedy described the flag as
"hold[ing] a lonely place ofhonor... constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs
in law and peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit."r70 However, Kennedy
cautions that these same beliefs "forces recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit
us."!71
t6'Id.at37l.
168 Id . at 406 .
t6e td.at4l4.
t1o Johnson,4gl U.S. at 421.
,r, ld-
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Admitting this to be a rare occurrence in which a Justice overtly expresses his distaste
for a result despite the possibility of undermining the decision,'l'? Kennedy was fully aware as
to the disagreeable implications ofthe holding. However, in Kennedy's mind, the
jurisprudential goal to insure "the word liberty in the Constitution is given its full and
necessary meaning"rT3 means extending its constitutional protections to all individuals
indiscriminately.
Though an individual's speech or expressive conduct may be grossly offensive and
appalling, such facts do not diminish that individual's power to invoke the Constitution, and in
light of the moral content of libefty, the Court must uphold the First Amendment. As
Kennedy stated, "[t]he hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like.
We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as
we see them, compel the result."'74 As poignant as it may be, indeed it is "fundamental that
the flag protects those who hold it in contempt."rTs
Hill v. Colorado (disx,nting opinion #2\
ln Hill v. Colorado,the majority concluded that protestors were properly banned from
demonstrating in front of an abortion facility and upheld a Colorado law that established a
172 See id. at 420'21("The had fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make
them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to express
distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. This is one of
those rare cases").
113 Nomination Heorings, supr.r rlote 37 , at 122 (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
tia lohnson- 491U-s- ar 420-21 .
,rt ld.
protestor-free buffer zone prohibiting speakers from "engaging in oral protest, education, or
counseling"rT6 within one hundred feet of the entrance to an abortion clinic.rTT
In his dissent, Kennedy stated that the essence of the First Amendment is to guard
against the tyranny of"ulaws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or morality of
the govemment's own policy,"rTE Kennedy reminded the reader that un der Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,any plea to outlaw abortions will be to no effect, and absent the ability
to ask the government to intervene, citizens who oppose abortions have no other choice but to
"seek to convince their fellow citizens of the moral imp€rative of their cause."rTe
Kennedy continued that "[f]or the lrst time, the Court approves a law which bars a
private citizen from passing a message, in a peaceful manner and on a profound moral issue,
to a fellow citizen on a public sidewalk,"rEo and believed the law to be a "prohibition [which]
seeks to eliminate public discourse on an entire subject and topic."r8r Kennedy further argued
that by restricting the right to engage in public protest of important moral and social issues is
to "deny the neutrality that must be the fust principle of the First Amendment."r82 Kennedy
challenged the majodty's opinion as disregarding "the importance of free discourse and the
exchange ofideas in a traditional public forum"'83 and accused the majority of forgetting that:
"Our foundational First Amendment cases are based on the recognition that
citizens. . . must be able to discuss issues, great or small, through the means of
expression they deem best suited to their purpose.It is for the speaker, not the
government, to choose the best means of expressing a message. The First
r?6 Hill v. Colorado,530 U.S. 703,707 (2000).
,11 Id-
'1e Id-at78'1.
t1e td- at78'7-88.
t8o td. at765.
t|t Id- at 770.
r3'?Eilr,530 u.s. at 789.
t't ld. at'7'18.
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Amendment...protects citizens' right not only to advocate their cause but also
to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing."r8a
Here,just as he had communicated in Texas v. Johnson,Kennedy is steadfast in his
jurisprudential philosophy of giving liberty its full and necessary meaning. To Justice
Kennedy, this means that in a free society that promotes diversity of ideas, the moral content
of liberty compels the Court to respect every person's right to freedom of speech regardless of
the speaker's message, and the govemment cannot take it upon itselfto decide which groups
to intermittently protect from that message.
Citizens United v. FEC (maiontt ooinion #61
It Citizens United, Kellrredy wrote the majority opinion in which the Court affirmed
and extended the First Amendment free speech rights of corporations.l8s The issue in this case
dealt with federal campaign finance laws and the ability of corporations to spend its treasury
money to support or oppose political candidates.
Citizens United was a nonprofit corporation that produced and released a documentary
called Hillary: The Movie d,uing Hillary Clinton's candidacy for the Democratic nomination
in 2008. The movie was a "feature-length negative advertisement that urge[d] viewers to vote
against Clinton for President" shot with "historical footage, interviews with persons critical of
her, and voiceover narration" to criticize and question Clinton's "character and fitness for the
offi ce of the Presidency."r 86
The nonprofit corporation wanted to increase the film's public distribution and was
prepared to pay $ 1.2 million to make Hillary avallable for public viewing on video-on-
I341d. ar 780-81 .
r3s See Citizens United v. Fed. Elecrion Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
t36 td- at 325.
35
demand in the days leading up to the primary elections,r8T but feared it would violate the
Federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCp.,4") and sought declaratory judgmentrs8 The
BCRA prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures for "electioneering communications," which was defined as "any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication" that refers to a "clearly identified candidate for Federal
office" made within 30 days of a primary election.r8e
Originally, the question presented to the Court was whether the BCRA applied to
Hillary, which was a video-on-demand film. However, the Court conceded that it could not
resolve the dispute on a narrower ground "without chilling political speech," and the much
broader question ofwhether the BCRA 
- 
which limited corporations' independent spending
in elections 
- 
is unconstitutional.le0
Writing for the majority, Kennedy reaffrmed that the First Amendment "extends to
corporations"lel engaging in political speech and held that the BCRA's ban on corporate
campaign spending violated the corporation's First Amendment right to free speech.re2
According to Kennedy, "political speech does not lose First Amendment protection "simply
because its source is a corporation,"re3 and a corporation, just like an individual, can
contribute to the "discussion ofthe debate" by expressing ideas or opinions and spending
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money to support or oppose a political candidate. Kennedy rejected the argument that the
political speech of "corporations and associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not "natural persons.'''le4 Instead, Kennedy
held that the First Amendment protected all political speech and does not allow restrictions of
speech based upon "the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual,"re5 and further stated that "[political speech is indispensable to decisionmaking in
a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than
. r.., ,.,t96
an tnolvlouat.
Stating that "[t]his Court has not hesitated to ovemrle decisions offensive to the First
Amendment,"leT Kennedy ovemrled two of the Court's previous First Amendment cases that
upheld campaign finance laws that restricted corporate expenditues. ln lhe frst, Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld a Michigan law that banned corporation
independent expenditures that supported or opposed candidates for state office. Similar to
Citizens United, the corporation in Austin wanted to use its general treasury funds to print
newspaper ads supporting a candidate for state office. Noting the corrosive and distorting
effects of "immense aggregations of wealth accumulated with the help ofthe corporate form
that has little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas," the
Austin court explained that the structure of the corporate form facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries, and that these large aggregations of funds "can unfairly influence elections" when
'eo td. at 343.
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they are deployed in the guise ofpolitical contributions.re8 Concluding that the Michigan law
was designed to prevent corporations from obtaining "an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace" " by using "resources amassed in the economic marketplace"ree the Court held
that the "State has articulated a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction on
independent expenditures by corporations."2@ In the second, case, McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission21l ,the Court relied on the same "antidistortion rationale"2o2 recognized
in lzstin to uphold the BCRA provision at issue in Citizens United 
- 
the restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures.203
Kennedy rejected the antidistortion rationale recogni zed in Austin and McConnelfoa
because he felt it was contrary to the Constitution to focus on the economic wealth of
corporate speakers, for "[t]he First Amendment's protections do not depend on the speaker's
"financial ability to engage in public discussion."2osAccording to Kennedy, the rule that
political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker's wealth is "a necessary consequence of
the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression ofpolitical speech
based on the speaker's identity."206 Kennedy reasoned that because the First Amendment
'e8 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 ( 1990).
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prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker's identity, it followed that
the Constitution also forbids limitations on political speech based on a speaker's wealth.2o7
The magnitude of this decision seems to contradict Kennedy's prior views on
contributions made to political action committees ("PACs"). In the 1980 case California
Medical Associatioz, Kennedy decided that placing limitations on contributions made to
PACs are not eligible for the full protections ofthe free speech clause ofthe First
Amendment. When people contribute to a PAC they choose that committee in order to
express themselves on political issues and make the contribution to, in essence, advocate their
views.2o8At his nomination hearings Kennedy was asked to explain why limiting this form of
expression would not be a limitation on the free speech principles of the First Amendment,
Kennedy responded:
"This was a case in which we were asked to interpret a new statute passed by
the Congtess. We thought we had guidance from the Court that conholled the
decision. We expressed the view, as we understood the law of the Supreme
Court, that this was speech by proxy. This was not direct speech by the person
who was spending the money, rather he or she was delegating it to an
intermediary. We thought that was a sufficient grounds for the Congress of the
United States in the interest ofensuring the purity ofthe election process to
regulate the amount ofthe contribution."20e
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that in Citizens United, Kennedy never focused on the
issue ofcorporate personhood2l0 in his opinion, and he never stated that because corporations
are people, they must be treated the same as individuals for purposes ofthe First Amendment.
Rather, Kennedy framed the issue as whether the speech is the type of speech protected by the
,o, Id.
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First Amendment, not whether the speaker is the type ofperson who can claim First
Amendment rights.2lr In Justice Kennedy's mind, because the political speech at issue is
protected by the First Amendment, it is ofno consequence whether the speaker is a
corporation or a human being.
Plnr IV: Coxcr,usrox
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy takes a moral approach in interpreting
the Constitution, and the Justice firmly believes that is possible for the constitutional
protections ofliberty to encompass situations and circumstances not specifically articulated
by the court nor found in the Constitution's text by virtue ofthem being implicitly contained
therein. According to Kennedy, if the protection isjust or central to "our American tradition
and the rule of law,"212 not only does the court have an obligation to enforce such a
protection, but where the text ofthe Constitution allows for this protection, the Constitution
must be interpreted to include it, in order to insure "the word liberty in the Constitution is
given its full and necessary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the document as we
understand it."2ll
'ztt ld- at 392-93 (Scalia, J., concurring) ('"The Amendment is written in terms of "speech," not
speakers...We arc therefore simply left with the question whether the speech at issue in this case is "speech"
covered by the Ffust Amendment. No one says otherwise").
2t2 Nomination Hearings, supra nob 3'I , at 86 (statement of Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy).
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